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For Helmut Schmidt, the party is over - the result of a vote by 
members of the German Bundestag to oust the SPO Ch'ancel 1 or .of eight 
years in favor of CDU candidate Helmut Kohl. The Bundestag vote of 
October 1, 1982 marks the first time in the history ·of the Federal Re-
public that the constructive vote of non-confidence has been success-
fully invoked to replace a Chancellor prior to regularly scheduled 
national elections. The only other attempt to remove West Germany's 
chief executive by means of a parliamentary ballot occurred in April, 
1972, when Christian Democrat Rainer Barzel failed to unseat Wflly · 
Brandt by one vote (with two abstentions). 
Peculiar to the Federal Republic, the constructive non-confidence 
mechanism was designed to ensure stability of leadership among not-yet-· 
entrenched democratic institutions. It is intended to guarantee the 
peaceful trans.fer of power during a period of governmental crisis in a 
country whose inability to sustain stable party majorities has been held 
singularly responsible for two world wars in this century. Helmut Kohl 
now appears to have a finn grip on the levers of government, parliamen-
tary elections have been scheduled for March of 1983, the Rechtsstaat 
has not collapsed. Liberal democracy in postwar Gennany has undergone 
the ultimate empirical test, and the results are positive. There fol-
. lows a global sigh of relief. 
Was there really any doubt that the Federal Republic would rot suc-
ceed at democracy? Was there ever a point between the announcement of 
the FDP's decision to break ranks with the social-liberal coalition and_ 
. ..,, 
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the appointment of the new Kohl Cabinet when the spectre of 1933 was 
briefly seen lurking in the wings? 
The transition will certainly not be an easy one for Helmut Kohl--
allegedly a 11 nice guy 11 with virtually no foreign policy experience, 
whose highest state ·executive offi'ce to date has been the ministerial 
presidency in Rhineland-Palatinate. Unlike another national leader with 
a similar profile, Kohl is a professional politician. Perhaps more 
importantly, he is part of a new generation of potential leaders too 
young to have directly participated in the events of 1933-1945, one of 
a generation whose ascension up the political ladder is grounded in his 
capabilities as a professional party manager. The same problems which 
brought about the downfall of the SPD-FDP coalition after thirteen years 
--the questions of where to cut the budget, how to stimulate the econo.-: 
my, how to overcome growing citizen unrest with respect to ecological 
and.-defense issues, how to win back ·alienated, apolitical, 11 no future 11 
youth--continue to dominate the agenda, with little prospect for imme-
diate resolution in sight. While the Christian Union has witnessed less 
party-internal division over these issues, there is still sufficient 
diversity among its members to prevent Kohl from presenting his plat-
form as the proverbial 11one best way, 11 on the one hand, and insufficient 
diversity, on the other, to reflect accurately the degree and dimensions 
of the polarization that has grabbed hold of large segments of the German 
citizenry in recent months. 
What holds a democratic system together? The answer provided by 
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Almond and Verba in 1965 was both logical and; simple: tne right poli-
tical culture. The ideal "civic culture" was defined as one in which 
there is a substantial consensus on the legitimacy of 
political institutions and the direction and content of 
public policy, a widespread tolerance of a plurality of 
interests and belief in their reconcilability and a 
widely distributed sense of political competence and 
mutua 1 trust in the citizenry. 1 
The civic culture rests on a measure of citizen conmi'bnent_to demo-
cratic values, processes and institutions (the authors werenever·ex-
plicit about how-much-is-enough). Support for the system is presumably 
diffuse, that is, not attached to specific instances of system perfor-
mance. Related to the need for diffuse support, yet certainly under-
estimated in Almond and Verba's assessment of Germany's democratic pros~ 
pects in the early 1960 1s, is the role played by a positive sense of 
national identity. The relation would appear to be a reciprocal one. 
Conmitment to a particular system and its established institutions re-· 
quires that citizens first be able to identify the boundaries of that 
system (nationhood commonly understood to involve shared language, 
hi story and common customs in a given terri tori a 1 space). The outputs, 
i.e. decisions ~r policies of that system, must be clearly distinguishable 
from those of other systems. Both the Gennan occupational experience 
and the unresolved issue of reunification, up until the Quadripartite 
Agreement of 1971 and the Basic Relations Treaty of 1972, hindered the 
\·--
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Federal Republic in its efforts to define itself as a sovereign nation-
state. Conversely, as David Conradt has argued, "the absence of a 
shared attachment to a particular state and political system has thus 
been the missing component in the German sense of national identity. 112 
Inquiries into the character of West Gennan political culture are 
once again .in vogue. The appearance of Almond and Verba's The Civic 
Culture Revisited in 1980 enabled a select number of country-specialists, 
anned with the wisdom of hindsight and the products of much more sophis-
ticated survey researc~ technology, to revise earlier interpretations 
and to review the impact of later developmen~ on their respectiv~ poli-
tical cultures as a whole. Of the five nations originally studied, the 
Federal Republic has clearly emerged as the one' having undergone the 
most dramatic transfonnation, even if it was not voted the system 11most 
1 i kely to succeed11 at the time of the surveys .. Fonnerly .a travesty of 
political development, the FRG has become a participatory dynamo, a 
leading actor in Western Europe, an anchor in the stonny seas of inter-
national political economy; in short, it has been labeled a 11 laboratory 
for the study of political change. 113 
This essay attempts to synthesize the findings of five relatively 
recent works on the. evolution of the West 1German political system, in 
pursuit of three general themes. The first addresses the special condi-
tions confronting the Federal Republic in its early efforts to cultivate 
a democratic political culture. Edwin Hartrich in particular explores 
the relationship between a thriving economy and the attainment of a 
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stable democracy. He is not alone in underlining the advantages in-
herent to many trade-offs the Bonn government was forced to make as a 
defeated power in the late 1940 1 s and early 1950's. The Second theme 
addresses questions contrasting the diffuse support lately found .to 
exist among German citizens for the system as a whole, and qualms arising 
from 11 offenses 11 launched against particular decisions·or elements of 
that system (e.g. the reaction to Ostpolitik., the allegations of unre-
sponsiveness on the part of "catchall" political parties). Baker, 
Dalton and Hildebrandt conclude that the Federal Republic has "come a 
long way, 11 while- Conradt and the Greiffenhagens are conscious of the· many 
potentially explosive 1ssues mining the path that still lies ahead. The 
third theme looks to the meaning of change, focusing on a metamorphosis 
in the Gennan "understanding of democracy" which manifests itsel.f in the 
clashes .between Old Politics and New Politics, between conventional and 
unconventional concepts of participation. Subject competence and a 
willingness to participate rest at the heart of the Civic Culture, as 
originally defined. The larger question is what concept of democracy 
has detennined the development of political culture and access to poli-
tical institutions over the last thirty five years, and what model o,f 
democracy Germany is 1 ikely to pursue in the future. 
ECONOMIC GIANT, POLITICAL DWARF 
Edwin Hartrich argues that material insecurity served as the driv~ 
ing force in German efforts to create a stable political system. The 
.,..7_ 
memory of economic hardships suffered during the thirties, reinforced 
by the inflation and unemployment nightmares of the late 1940's, turned 
the search for material security into a national quest. The argument 
suggests that German citizens have come to embrace democratic institu-
tions for their ability to promote growth and preserve economic stabi-
1 i ty. 
Hartrich's characterization of Germany in the seventies as the 
11 Fourth and Richest Reich" rests on the assumption that the leaders of 
the new Repub 1 i c found in ecom;>mi cs a most sa ti sfyi ng Ersatz for po 1 i -
tics. Indeed, after its unconditional surrender in May, 1945, Germany 
had no choice but to seek a new raison d'~tre, having been stripped of 
all political functions by the. Allied Command. For Hartrich, the story_ 
has a happy ending; the Wirtschaftswunder·, based on a free, albeit 
11 social 11 market economy, proved to be one of capitalism's finest hours. 
Prevailing wisdom maintained that an affluent state could be expected 
to produce a stable political ·state, even if the initial occupational 
directives for the dismantling of German industrial capabilities clearly 
contradicted this premise. 
-Effusive in his praise for Erhard's bold and unflinching commit-
ment to a 11 supply and demand" strategy, beginning with the currency re-
. form of 1948, Hartrich unwittingly prepares a case in favor of prewar 
economic management strategies and against the untrammeled forces of 
competitive capitalism. The ~llies, in fact, could have seriously 
bungled the occupation, had not the Korean war intervened and left the 
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new Republic to dig its own way out of the rubble. As the regular 
Prnerican troops clamored to be sent: home less than a year after the 
German surrender, they were replaced by new draftees with only weeks of 
military experience. An estimated fifty percent 'of these draftees showed 
an intelligence rating of 50-90; a Class Five soldier with a rating 
of 75 or below "was considered little better than a moron in unifonn, 
fit only for simple labor such as trench-digging11 -- hardly a suitable 
role model for introducing _the democratic persona 1 i ty. 4 For an over-
whelming portion of the civilian population, the years 1945 to 1947 
marked Gennany's 11darkest hour, 11 as unemployment rose sharply owing to 
industrial disruption, some 7.8 million refugees poured in from the 
East, and caloric ,intake during the coldest wi.nter of the century drop-
ped from a prewar level of 3,000 to 1.,550 to- 700 calories .. a day. 5 The 
Zigarettenwirtschaft, the black market which recognized Lucky Strikes 
as a de facto reserve currency, was pennitted to remove scarce food and 
j 
energy supplies from nonnal circulation for two years, before Allied com-
manders realized that guaranteed military exchange rates for East and 
West occupation marks had resulted in a $800 million subsidy to the 
Soviet Union.6 
Initial occupational directives, including a watered-down version 
of the Morgenthau·Plan contained in JCS 1067, ignored the hfstorical 
lesson that democracy is unlikely to develop out of defeat.. Clearly, a 
Germany rendered industrially impotent had little chance of establishing 
a stable political system. It was naive to assume that a civic culture 
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could begin to flourish in a society of economically insecure, quasi-
indentured servants. 
Di verse denazi fi cation mechanisms adopted in the three Wes tern 
zones showed the United States to be most persistent in its efforts to 
track down Nazi accomplices at the lower levels--while many major of-
fenders went unpunished and unpursued. Convict:ions of minor offenders 
deprived the system of critical, qualified personnel during the re-
construction; 50 percent-of the prewar doctors, for example, served as 
ditch~diggers during a time when poor nutrition was resulting in ever 
higher disease rates. Bureaucrats were summarily denazified and re-
turned to their posts. 7 
Demilitarization policies proved equally inconsistent with abstract 
Allied intentions of transforming the remnants of·a dictatorship into 
a democratic polity. The Western zones, on their own, were defenseless 
at a time when Soviet encroachment in Europe was rapidly becoming the 
focal Allied concern. Less than ten years after surrender, the new 
Republic was forced to undertake a rapid rearmament program in support 
of American cold war efforts, despite a nation-wide opposition campaign, 
the Kampf dem Atom-Tod movement. From the beginning, Germany-West served. 
as the European linchpin in the US campaign against communfsm--a heavy 
responsibility for a land with no material surplus and no prior success 
with democracy. 
As American attention shifted to the Asian theater, the "Chancellor 
of the Allies," Konrad Adenauer, was left to monitor an economy that 
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quickly reverted to old mangement practices, such as cartelization, and 
fonner production activities~ i.e. quick revitalization of the steel 
and ship-building industries. 8 Financial assets were concentrated. 
on the basis of shareholders• proxie votes, turned over to the boards 
of major banks (Depotstirrrnung). Reconstruction entrepreneurs were 
blessed with an abundance of state incentives, and labor costs were held 
low by post war unemployment. 
1 
Politics for Adenauer consisted of efforts to secure equal stand-
ing for the Bonn government in the cOtmJUnity of European nations. His 
11 non-policy 11 toward the Eastern sector was in essence a variation on 
the Ersatz theme; his motto 11 negotiation through strength 11 rested.on 
the be·lief that a booming West German economy would exercise a magnetic 
influence on citizens in the East, whose unfulfilled material and poli-
tical needs would move them to throw off the forces of conmunism and 
to seek reunification under Western tenns. Social-Democratic hopes for 
reunification were dashed by the events of 1959 to 1961. The Godesberg 
Program of 1959 accepted the free market fonnula 11 as much competition 
as possible, as much planning as necessary. 11 By the time of the con-
struction of the Berlin Wall, the metamorphosis of the SPD irito a maj-
oritarian-hopeful party was almost complete.· Final confinnation of its 
new standing as a non-Marxist 11 people 1s-party 11 came with th.e installation 
of the SPD-FDP coalition in 1969. 
As late as 1975, the New York Times had.yet to abandon Willy 
Brandt's characterization of the Federal Republic as 11 an economic giant, 
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but a political dwarf. 119 The time has now come to question the appro-
priateness and. the accuracy of such a designation. In a global system 
beset with multidimensional economic crises, economic strength has 
replaced sheer military might as the new basis of pol i ti cal power to 
a significant degree (Ronald Reagan 1 s attempts to turn back the clock 
to the days of unchallenged American military superiority notwith-
standing.). In the 1980 1 s, a true measure of a nation I s power and its 
international influence can be derived from its industrial-technological 
capabilities, its stable monetary reserves, its freedom to search out 
its own export-import partners and its success in negotiating favorable 
terms of trade. lO 
The 11ecopolitical state 11 to which Hartrich'gives such high marks 
cannot be equated with the civic culture. The unique consensus on. 
national priorities through the early fifties made it possible for a 
quickly constructed ship of state to remain firmly anchored in a tur-
bulent sea of international relations. As was to be expected, that 
consensus began to dissipate once economic security had been achieved. 
The new sociopolitical conflicts that occupied the center stage from 
the late sixties to the mid seventies escape Hartrich 1 s purview. But 
what will hold the institutions together once economism is no longer an 
effective· ad.hesive? Is there a danger that the institutions will -be . 
jettisoned, if it appears that economic security is beginning to erode? 
Unlike the ecopolitical state, the civic culture by definition pre-
sumes, in fact encourages, a plurality of interests. A truly civic 
:.. 
-12-
culture would decry the conduct of politics by economic managers in 
lieu of alternating, responsive, elected officials. The weighty con-
sensus that holds the ship to its moorings can not be ·used to propel it 
out to sea, once the storm has subsided. 
The rest·of the world is no doubt still rather puzzled as to why 
the Gennan citizenry saw fit to dispose of Helmut Schmidt, recognized 
globally as a fonnidable statesman, over questions of economic per-
fonnance. At this writing, both the Gennan unemployment rate of 7.5 
percent and an inflation figure of 5-6 percent register as the lowest 
among the advanced industrial nations. These figures sooner provide 
grounds for emulation (and possibly envy), than for removing a chancellor 
from office. 
Economic discomfiture ,is not. solely responsible for the fortnight 
of chaos preceding the non-confidence vote.' Disq,greement over specific 
budgetary cutbacks may offer a reason for the FOP' s decision to resign 
"from the coalition an September 17. It does not explain why the SPD 
was able to draw a startling 42.8 percent of the vote in the cri ti.cal 
Hessian election on September 26, only to prove incapable of rallying 
the.forces of the left scattered across the parties to back Schmidt on 
October 1, 1982. 
Nor is successful economic performance to be judged the only source 
of legitimacy enjoyed by the political system. With all due respect to 
Fassbinder, the political metaphor for postwar Germany is neither Maria 
Braun, nor Veronika Voss. It is Oskar at the grave of Matzerath, putting 
• 
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aside the drum that was both his salvation and livelihood, as he makes 
his conscious decision to grow. 11 Under Schmi1dt, the Federal Republic 
has come of political age, though the growing pains are likely to re-
main acute for some time. The reasons for Schmidt I s downfall are deci d-
edly political, rooted in growing popular disaffection with a concept of 
democracy too narrowly defined as a Parteienstaat. Growth~ se does 
not put a halt to the search for identity. Democracy is not equivalent 
to a steady state. 
DIFFUSE SUPPORT AND ISSUE CONFLICTS 
Conradt, the Greiffenhagens, Baker, et ~-have undertaken two com-
mon tasks: to verify, for better or worse, the stabi 1 i ty of West Gennan~ 
political institutions, and to show that stability is a function of 
diffuse, if not 11 active II support, no longer dependent on economic per-
fonnance. The dominant theme is change, the prognosis is generally pos-
itive. 
Gennany Transfonned - Political Culture and the New Politics is an 
attitudinal history of the Republic in miniature, none of whose findings 
are counterintuitive. Like the quasi-paradigm of 11 Post-Materialism11 
from which the more interesting hypotheses are estensibly -derived, the 
study postulates a Maslowian-type scale of national needs and political 
interests. The internal logic of this scale dictates that 11 ttie approach-
ing resolution of material and security issues will result in the add-
; tion of new issues to the po 1 iti cal agenda. Increasingly, po 1 i ti cs wi 11 
l 
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be concerned with questions of life styles and the quality of life, rather 
than the guanti ty of economic rewards. 1112 
The transfonnation of the political agenda owes to three interacting 
and occasi ona 1 ly overlapping sources of change. ~lot surprisingly, 
Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt underline the significance of economic 
development which has weakened, if not eliminated, traditional social 
class cleavages, thereby modifying the language as well as the substance 
of political debate in the Federal Republic. The survey data are used 
to explore the extent to which economic and occupational trends ac-
companying the advanced industrialization of Gennany have strengthened 
the support for democratic nonns and increased political involvement. 
Justifiable pride in the miraculous achievements of the economy has. 
given way to a sense of confidence in the overarching institutions. 
Affluence and technological advancement have worked in concert to pro".' 
vide·both the free·time and the access to infonnation-necessary for 
more meaningful political involvement. The subsequent expansion of the 
higher educational system has outfitted members of the new middle class 
with conceptual skills, knowledge of the system 1 s .weaknesses as well as 
strengths, and the inclination to participate. 
Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt are more sensitive than Hartrich to 
the impact of generational change on the degree of system acceptance. 
They delineate five historical periods·(Wilhelmine, Weimar, Third Reich, 
Early Republic-of 1946-1955, late Republic, post-1956) in efforts to assess 
at what age respondents will be subject to maximal influences from the 
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domestic and international, political and economic environments. The 
negative political experiences affecting cohorts during the first three 
periods have produced citizens who are understandably more reluctant to 
give vent to opinions regarding domestic political developments. The 
international order poses qualitatively different types of threats to 
the security needs of individuals whose socialization is confined .to 
the two.postwar periods. Accustomed to economic miracles and ideolog-
ically hostile spheres of global influence,younger cohorts are free to 
develop criticisms directed against the internal operations of the sys-
tem in a way that the Grt.lndergeneration could not. 
Dramatic sociopolitical changes in the Federal Republic are also 
· attributable to the metamorphosis in the character and qualifications of 
political elites. Hartrich deals only with those he judges to be the 
11 great me11 11 of modern German history, such as Adenauer, Erhard, Krupp, 
Schiller. Baker et .!l. attend to the influence of a new leadership class 
which comes to power after the watershed election of 1969. The SPD is 
judged to have made an independent contribution to the acceptance of 
democratic institutions and the accelerated decline of class cleavages. 
Unprecedented economic recovery, radically different socialization 
patterns and the ideological shifts represented by a new political lead-
ership have precipitated changes in the political culture, changes in the 
political agenda and changes in the nature of Gennan partisan politics • 
. The Federal Republic emerges as a system in which interest in politics 
is on the rise within and across a 11 income groups; willingness to par,.. 
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ticipate continues to grow, particularly among members of an· expanding, 
professional "new middle class." A veritable explosion in the numbers .. 
of voter and citizen initiatives beginning in the late 1960 1s lays to 
rest the image of Gennany as a passive 11 subject11 political culture, de-
void of a sense of par:tisanship and efficacy. The focus on economic 
concerns has· thus far been inversely related to the perceived health 
of .the economy, with the.exception of a temporary downt~rn in 1966-67. 
But as Baker and associates also discover, "perceptions of the economy 
changed in response to altered political constellations, not political 
a 11 egi ances in res pons-e to economic even ts. 1113 
Adenauer 1 s willingness to relinquish claims to national sovereignty 
in favor of European integration efforts amounted to a paradox of sorts, 
in that it actually hastened the recognition of Germany as a sovereign 
state within the Defense COJTD1tunity in 1954. The SPO ended its opposition 
to integration, once it realized the costs.of reunification were pro-
hibitive. By the late 1960 1 s, it was the SPO pushing ahead in. efforts. . 
to cultivate good relations with both the East and the West. Survey 
resu·lts indicate that a public which was becoming increasingly interested 
in foreign affairs, also increasingly came to support and demand a more 
11cooperative 11 foreign policy stance - inprofound contrast to orienta .. 
h 1 1 
. 14 tions during t e Ear y Repub , c. · 
As foreign policy emphases shifted from reunification to security 
to detente, domestic concerns moved from Fressen to Moral, from an in-
terest in material outputs only to a focus on political processes and 
,1. 
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quality of life issues .. Urging citizens to 11 dare more democracy!1 Brandt 
proposed to initiate an era of sweeping internal refonns, most of which 
lost out to Ostpo1itik. The SPD was at once the harbinger and chief bene-
ficiary of the New Politics, though recent events suggest it has been 
unsuccessful at incorporating the panoply of new issues.that would have 
secured the votes of younger, new middle class activists. Promising 
more, the SPD incurred the risk of disappointing many, in contrast to 
the CDU/CSU intent on-maintaining the status quo. 
"Gennany Transformed 11 is pronounced a truly civic culture, one in 
which participatory nonns are widespread, system support is well deve-
loped and genera_lized. 15 But that transformation calls for a sense of 
qualified optimism. The more diffuse the attachment to the political 
system, the less rigid and unquestioning the commitment one is likely 
to find arriong the successor generation to preserving specific institu-
tions and procedures in their.present form. In this respect, the FRG 
has 11 caught up, 11 indeed may be surpassing more established democracies 
by engaging in a fundamental debate as to the meaning of participation 
in a democratic system. The proliferation of 11 initiatives 11 points to 
the obligation of established political insti.tutions--including parties 
--to change and adapt in response to citizen needs, rather than to 
satisfy their own organizational imperatives. 
Having also "caught up" with the economic malaise afflicting other 
advanced industrial societies, will the Federal Republic witness a shift 
back to an agenda based on Old Politics? Baker et _tl project a conver- _ 
;;_ 
gence. of Old and New Political agenda items. One.must caution, however, 
' \ 
that a return to old issues of economic stability and national·security 
pose gualita~ively different challenges to the policy-makers, in that 
they are now expected to resolve all these problems simultaneously, not 
in ascending order as the Maslowian scale presumes. 
David Conradt's depiction of the Gennan Polity, is both more cau-
tious than the Baker text, on the one hand;; and more optimistic than 
the Greiffenhagen assessment, on the other. The publisher boldly claims 
that Conradt's is "the only study of the postwar Federal Republic which 
treats the West-German polity as a stable rather than a provisional 
-creation whose future holds the ever present threat of some Nazi-coup. 1116 
Then why does Conradt fee 1 compe 11 ed to hedge his bets, by raising two 
' ( 
familiar questions? (1) Has the Federal P-epublic succeeded in consoli-
dating a political system that guarantees a balance between conflict and 
consensus, 1 i berty and order, i ndi vi dual ism and community? (2) Is the 
highly acclaime<i economic miracle of the 1950 1 s and 1960 • s being matched• 
by a Genn~n political miracle in the 1970's and 1980's? 
Conradt's answers tend in the. affirmative direction. The German 
polity, he holds, enjoys. a degree of legitimacy and consensus unknown to 
any other teutonic regime in the twentieth century. More importantly, 
having achieved a degree of consensus, the polity is now confronted with 
an array ,of social problems that could not have been addressed earlier, 
in part-because they·are themselves the by-products of economic surplus 
and democratic ideals. Conradt is not squeamish in his treatment of 
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several of those issues, ranging from terrorism, to guestworkers, to 
restrictians on civil liberties in cases banning suspected radicals 
from civil service employment. He is sensitive to the historical ante-
cedents of these problems; however, to accept the-conclusion he draws, that 
"Bonn, in contrast to Weimar, is not a Republic without republicans," 
but one in fact "rooted in a solid attitudinal consensus on the values, 
processes and institutions of liberal democracyll_ still requires a great 
leap of faith. 17 A g_overnment that insisted on subjecting to rigorous 
interrogation 454,585 of its most highly educated and politically sensi-
tive young citizens between 1973-1975 in order to weed out the 314 
( .0006%_) who might really intend its overthrow, is one replete with 
doubt about its own ability to confront conflict and forge conserisus.18 . 
Ironically, Conradt turns out to be most thought-provoking in ex-
actly those areas where,he seeks to advance a very cautious interpreta-
tion. The Federal Republic has adjusted to and accepted its 1 permanent 
provisional II status, especially in relation to "the other Germany. 11 
Survey data show West Germans to be among the best politically informed 
, 
and the most electorally active citizens in all modern democracies. 
Yet the Basic Law which determines the character of citizen-state inter-
actions is itself an essentially nnegative11 document, created only for 
provisional use~ The detailed, restrictive nature of the document was 
meant to safeguard the Republ~c against the chaos 9f Weimar and the 
tyranny of the Third Reich during its formative years. Such restrictions 
are likely to have a very different impact on a citizenry actively 
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committed to democratic-participatory norms. Changing socio-economic 
conditions have mandated frequent amendments, 31 in all from 1949 to 
1982 -- in contrast ttJ 26 such modifications of the American Constitu-
tion from 1776 to 1976. 19 Has the Basic Law outlived its usefulness? 
There i.s a growing propensity in the FRG to interpret explicitly · 
political conflicts in constitutional-legal terms. Political leaders 
obsessed with the question of who is/who isn't an "enemy of the consti-
tution11 postpone (or evade) the search for solutions to pressing socio-
economic problems. Those who would maintain a "state of siege" mental-
ity are those who hope to gain politically. The most recent instance 
involved the CDU Secretary General, Heiner Geiss.ler, who charged the 
widely respected FOP deputy, former state secretary and close friend of 
Genscher; Hildegard Hamm-Brtlcher, with "an attack ·on the constitution" 
for suggesting that the process of selecting a new Chancellor without 
the say of the voters, while legal, "offends morality and general Chris-
tian principles. 1120 
This is not the rational response.of a politician-coITTT1itted to the 
participatory norms of a civic culture. There persists.in the FRG an 
unwillingness to look politi~al conflict in the eye as the first step 
to resolving it. Domestic dissensus has twice resulted in world-politi-
ca 1 disasters. Germany has not yet digested the fact that conflict and 
dissent, not the unique national consensus that benefitted the Republic 
in the early years, is the normal state of affairs in a mature democracy. 
, 
During the nonconfidence vote on October 1, 1982, Brandt even felt com-
pelled to admonish his rival of 1972, Rainer Barzel, to 11 stop acting as 
.. 
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if this were a question of saving the fatherland. It is purely question 
of party and power interests, and this is the way the majority of citi-
zens in this country understand it. 1121 
Just as problem children are more often than not the product of 
broken homes, Martin and Sylvia Greiffenhagen draw attention to the fact 
that the rad i ca 1 s, the chaoti cs, the Greens, the citizen action groups 
are the offspring of· a schwieriges Vaterland. The children are not 
untouched by the afflictions of the father, even if 40 percent of German 
16 to 24 year olds report they know little or nothing about Hitler and 
the Third Reich. 22 There are significant overlaps between the Baker 
volume and the Greiffenhagen study, both in terms of conceptualization 
and w.ith respect to the actual data sets used to,, evaluate the democratjc 
health and well-being of this intransigent Fatherland. There are few 
shared conclusions, however, concerning the real nature of the "civic 
culture. 11 · 
The Greiffenhagens note that, as a long-standing German tradition 
the Rechtsstaat is inconsistent with democracy in many of its key ele-
ments. Efforts to use the Basic Law to reconcile "closed system" con-
straints with conflicts inherent to an open, system appear to rest on 
a faulty understanding of democracy, upon a model which has not been 
readjusted to serve the particular needs .of German political culture 
as it has evolved. 23 The agenda has changed over time to accommodate 
'first the economics of reconstruction, the politics of external secur-
ity, then the promises of social reform and the politics of internal secur-
ity, respectively. But instead of welcoming the growing 11.democratic 
i 
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potential," the political establishment has ignored, ridiculed and de-
nounced the Kritikfreudigkeit and Partizipationsbereitschaft of the 
youngest successor generation. Politics is construed as crisis manage-
nent; threats to political stability are attributed to the masses, ·rather 
than to overbe~ring organs of the state; dangers posed by the left are 
judged more serious than mobilization on the right. Defense of the 
.. 
constitution (Verfassungsschutz) has become a smoke screen for protec-
tion of the State (Staatsschutz) and its vested status guo interests. 
The "mutual trust" required by the civic culture is mis.sing. 
What causes this. state to eschew compromise? What is it about this: 
political culture that leads it.to turn against itself? Without ever 
consciously posing the question, the Greiffenhagen analysis provides at 
1 east an i ndi rect answer. 
The Federal Republic is "a CountrY of the Middle. 1124 Geography 
dictates that it develop the virtues and skills of a mediator, to foster 
a balance between two mutually exclusive Weltanschauungen. To side with 
only one or the other would be suicidal. Germany cannot avail itself 
of the 11Swiss-solution. 11 It has been denied the right to neutrality 
since 1948; to a degree, it has become a major political power against 
its will. This is to suggest that external pressures from tw~ opposing 
ideologica-1 camps have thus far kept the Vaterland from mellowing \'lith 
age. The mediation skills acquired during the Ostoolitik era have not 
yet been applied domestically. The links between anti-nuclear energy 
protests and the peace movement, for instance, between domestic policies 
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· and the state of international relations, cannot be overlooked. On the 
surface, the election of Helmut Kohl will have the effect of improving 
government-to-government relations with the US; a fundamental CDU com-
mitment to detente will not prove detrimental to Bonn's relations with 
Moscow. The CDU's anticipated crack down on protesters, squatters and 
radicals will exacerbate polarization tendencies within the FRG. But 
Bonn is not necessarily Weimar. 
OLD POLITICS, NEW POLITICS: QUESTIONS OF STYLE AND SUBSTANCE 
A difficult Vaterland is bound to encounter difficult relationships, 
the more significant ones involving citizens and political parties. 
Overaccommodati on, overgenera 1 i za ti on, overins ti tuti ona 1 i zati on and 
11 overload11 are the most serious problems affecti_ng the party system, 
according to the collective findings of a new German work edited by 
,Joachim Raschke. In the final analysis, however, the major problem is 
not that citizens are leaning too heavily .Q!!;, but that they have accel-
erated their exodus from the established party organizations. 
Overaccommodation: The dominant parties allegedly spend most of their 
energy accommodating those vested interest groups demanding preservation 
of the status quo, on the one hand, and making too many concessions to 
each other in their respective efforts to become the model Vol kspartei, 
on the other. . The SPD in particular is open to charges that it has be-
come too comfortable with the status quo, intent on glorifying past 
material achievements, rather than advancing structural reform. It soon-
er resembles a 11 tanker too bulky to budge out of port11 than an assemblage 
-24-
of vanguard refonners. 25 The Grand Coalition of the late sixties has 
given way to the 11 SPCDU-Cartel 11 of the late seventies. 26 
Over9eneralization: The search for a "new party typeJI among radi-
cal democrats and citizen action groups is not a call for a P.artyless 
po 1 i ty • They· ·comp 1 a i n i ns tead that p 1 a tf orm differences between the 
majoritarian parties are meaningless, ritualistic and self-serving; As 
"catchall parties," the COU, SPO and FOP hav.e attempted to reduce in-
terests to the least conman denominator,:thus evading critical Sinnfragen 
and acting as if 11 al1 problems were equal, 11 according to Raschke. The 
end of ideology has led to a boring routinizationof debate.27 
Overinstitutionalization: "Dialogue" 1s the fonnula whereby the 
state speaks, the people listen. There is a.growing gap between the 
social background of the leadership and those they presume to represent. 
Parties have created complicated filter systems for funneling discussion 
in_to already clogged bureaucratic channels, thereby shutting out those who 
choose to identify with neither Tweedledee nor Tweedledum. A new class of 
'· 
professional party functionaries has begun to spill-over into a variety of 
interest·associations, while civil servants are being dispatched to 
perform party-in-government chores. 28 
Overload: If, as. Hans Joe hen Vogel argues, party offi ci a 1 s are 
overwhelmed with routine tasks, it is because the established parties 
have actively cultivated a 11 jack of all trades 11 image, w~ich they cannot 
fulfill .29 Overload is in part self-imposed; the parties "feel respon-
sib,le11 for everything, from schools to television stations, but are re-
,i 
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luctant to part with these "burdens" even when volunteers are availableo 
Politicians perceive citizens' efforts to carve out a larger particfpa-
tory role for themselves as "disruptive;," The public is relegated to 
politics-as-spectator-sporto 30 The mass parties claim a monopoly over 
creative solutions to social problems, while a 1980 EMNID/SPIEGEL survey 
reveals that 78% of the electorate has lost confidence in their ability 
to produce solutions, periodo 31 Voters have far greater trust in the 
citizen initiatives' ability to provide objective information on social 
issueso 32 
As Reichel testifies, a major stumbling block to reform is the 
historical weight. attached to the concept of the 11 party-stateo 11 . The 
Parteienstaat is a postwar invention, resting on, the principle "as much 
consensus as possible, a~ little canpetition as necessaryo" Integration· 
is seen a hedge against a reenactment·of the partisan chaos that was 
Weimaro The "crisis of the party-state" is foresworn as a "crisis of 
. · 33 
democracyo" 
One may feel a twinge of sympathy at the plight of the FDP--it 
chose to play the game of political opportunism, and having lost, it must 
drop out. But external challenges to ineffective part1es are not "anti-
democratic." The Basic Law does not mandate a "2½'' party system; to do 
so would be to impose artificial limits on pluralism. The "5 percent. 
clause" is the bottom lineo Internal divisions have rendered the FOP 
quite capable of hanging itself, without any "help" from the Greens. 
The argument can be made that the FDP in many respects served as a de 
facto protest party throughout the 1960 1s and 1970 1s. By casting a 
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vote for the FDP, citizens could register dissatisfaction with SPD 
performance without jeopardizing the existence of the social-liberal 
coalitiono This might explain in part the record 1006 percent drawn 
by FDP candidates in the otherwise decisive rejection of Franz Josef 
Strauss in the 1980 elections. The proliferation of "citizen initiatives" 
during this period hardly suggests that the FDP, with its traditional 
corrmitment to free market growth strategies, was the beneficiary of a 
temporary spiritual renaissanceo It was not until the promulgation of 
the Dortmund platform in June, 1980, that the Greens succeeded in pre-
senting themselves as a bona fide party of protest at the national level, 
many of whose members were drawn from the SPD 1s disgruntled left wing. 
The vote of non-confidence was not a test of Schmidt.'s personal popularity, 
but an indictment of an equall_y factionalized, do-nothing SPD. The 
Greens become everybody's favorite scapegoat, when in fact the delegiti-
mization of the-established parties results from their own inability--
or worse, unwillingness--to synthesize the requisites of the Old with 
the New Politicso 34 
Hasenclever explains that the New Politics distinguishes itself in 
terms of style, substance and structure. 35 The "new party type" seeks 
.to build consensus--from the bottom up; the operational emphasis is on 
openess, rotation and internal democracy. Extraparliamentary activity 
is intended to complement and accelerate the long march through the elec-
toral institutions; it is not anti-democratic behavior per g_. Indeed, 
Kaase finds a positive correlation between those engaging in conventional 
and unconventional forms of participation. 36 Acti-vists tend to be well 
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educated professionals who have more time and self-confidence; in short, 
the sense of "efficacy" inherent to the civic culture leads to greater 
interest in participation. 
The revolution in values is no longer a silent one. The Green and 
Alternative Parties are tied to other protest groups in their rejection 
of efforts to ·play off economics against ecology. The point is that 
rational policies _in both areas are quintessential to the nation's future. 
In light ~f their educational backgrounds, the "Post~Materialists" can-
not be written off as touchy-feely idealists oblivious to the constraints 
of Realpolitik. Their major contribution rests in their ability to force 
the established parties into a fundamental reassessment of progranmatic 
gcalso 
The search for a "new party type" is being 'conducted simultaneously 
at the national and coll111unal levelso J.J. Hesse sees the greatest op-
portunities at the local level--where parties can be held painfully ac-
countable for their (non) perfonnance. 37 The Alternative parties hold -
that democracy requires a functional decentralization, not just a cos-
metic deconcentration of party activity. 
The very manner in whic~ Schmidt was deposed as Chancellor seems 
to underline the extent to which the Parteienstaat has placed itself 
above·the democratic process. It is not the new configurations being 
generated at the base that appear to be the major stumbling blocks to 
the further development of a Gennan civic cul tureo 
CONCLUSION: WHITHER THE CIVIC CULTURE? 
Responses to the_ recent transfer of executive power in the Federal 
\ 
Re pub 1 i c have been confused, mixed and even con tr ad ictory. They reflect 
-28-
varying degrees of confidence in the German commitment to democratic 
values and processes, as do the works considered in this essayo The 
assessments have ranged from grim ("end of postwar stability11 -Zo Brzezinski), 
to skeptical ( 11mired in uncertainty"-R. Thurow), from hopeful ("miracles, 
detente, now normalcy 11-Eo Pond), to satisfied ( 11a change ••• was needed"-
Wo Safire)o 38 
There is always room for doubto But there also comes a time for 
redefinitiono The civic culture construct advanced by Almond and Verba 
in the l960's was a product of the times. Economically, the world was 
a much stabler place; politically, _citizens appeared much more content 
to "feel" efficacious than to participate act-ivelyo In the l960's, the 
Federal Republic was judged too young_, too passive to merit the label 
11 civic culture;" some would now deny it that honor for being too en-
trenched or too participatoryo It would prove easier by far to revise 
an (undeniably-valuable) political science concept than to try to re-
reconstruct a complicated socio-political system at this point. As far 
as civic cultures of the 1980 1s go, the Gennan Federal Republic is demon-
strating itself to be no more and no less stable than the other advanced 
industrial nations which have sponsored its polit5cal-economic develop-
ment since 19450 These are nonetheless exciting times for students of 
German politicso The current political mood in the Federal Republic 
itself is perhaps best captured in the words of Bertolt Brecht: 
Ich sitze am StrassenharigG 
Der Fahrer wechselt das Rad. 
Ich bin nicht gern, wo ich herkomme. 
Ich bin nicht gem, wo ich hinfahre • 
. Warum sehe ich den Radwechsel 
Mit Ungedu1d? 39 
"' .. 
Notes 
The ideas explored in this paper are the by-product of a politically 
exciting, academically productive 1982 Summer research leave, made 
possible by the German Academic Exchange Service, the Center for Inter-
national Studies and·the Political Science Department at the University 
of Missouri-St. Louis. 
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